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Abstract
A typical implicit assumption on monopolistic competition models for trade
and economic geography is that ¯rms can produce and sell only at one place. This
paper allows endogenous determination of the number of plants in a new eco-
nomic geography model and examines the stable outcomes of organization choice
between single-plant and multi-plant in two regions. We explicitly consider the
¯rms' trade-o® between larger economies of scale under single plant con¯guration
and the saving in interregional transport costs under multi-plant con¯guration.
We show that organization change arises under decreasing transportation costs
and observe several organization con¯gurations under a generalized cost function.
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1 Introduction
As is con¯rmed by many studies, economic activities are unevenly distributed
among countries and regions.1 Krugman (1991) and Fujita, Krugman and Venables
(1999) established a systematic framework to analyze endogenous agglomeration of
workers and ¯rms using a combination of increasing returns and transportation costs,
called the New Economic Geography (henceforth, NEG). While there are a number of
model variants proposed, it is a typical assumption that each ¯rm consists of a single
plant. But in reality, when transportation costs are very high, it would be rational to
establish another plant in a distant market (Brainard (1997)). Firms face proximity-
concentration trade-o® in serving for distant markets, i.e., depending on the degree of
transportation costs including communication costs (c.f. trade costs), ¯rms may want to
build a new plant there, or export from the existing plant in their home market. While
proximity to market enables ¯rms to earn larger pro¯t by reducing trade costs, ¯rms
can exploit scale economies by concentrating their production at one place. Thus, for a
¯rm, the number of places for production must also be a choice variable as important
as their location.
Several factors can cause decrease in transportation costs such as advancement in
transport technology (airplanes, ships, trucks, rails, roads, etc.) and information tech-
nology (telegraphs, telephones, facsimiles, Internet, communication satellites, etc.), a
tari® reduction and harmonization of documentation for custom by trade agreements,
etc. A wider acceptance of English as business language in the market could also be
included in communication costs reduction. Mutual understandings among di®erent
cultures may decrease management costs among workers and managers. Such decrease
in broadly de¯ned transportation costs a®ect the organization of ¯rms internationally
and domestically.
In fact, there is a substantial presence of multiplant (unit) ¯rms in reality among
countries and regions. From the international point of view, Tomiura (2007) shows
that, in Japanese manufacturing, the share of multiplant ¯rms as FDI is 31.8% in
multinational ¯rms which engage in multinational activities such as exporting, foreign
outsourcing, foreign a±liates, etc.2 From the regional point of view, the share of multi
establishment varies across regions and among industries: agriculture (28.3%), man-
ufacturing (36.3%), and retailing (60.2%).3 The share of multi-establishment ¯rms is
1See, e.g., Combes and Overman (2004) for the case of EU, and Fujita, Mori, Henderson and
Kanemoto (2004) for the case of Japan.
2Note that the share of multinational ¯rms accounts for 9.4% in total of 118,300 samples in 1998.
3The data source is from \Establishment and enterprise census of Japan" in 2006 which covers all
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lower in Agriculture, Fisheries, and Forestry. On the other hand, manufacturing is
relatively higher and service sectors are much higher. In other words, primary products
have relatively smaller supply chain and services have larger supply networks. Since
most of services needs face to face communication with customers, it is di±cult to
ship the services to the other regions. In both of international and regional aspects,
multiplant (unit) ¯rms are not negligible organization type.
The aim of this paper is to propose a simple modi¯cation to NEG models, which
allows ¯rms to endogenize both the number and location of their plants in a two-region
economy. It is shown that the option to be multiplant changes the location equilibria
which have been obtained in the previous studies assuming single-plant ¯rms: since the
¯rms can change the number of plants beside the location of each plant. In particular,
the organization change of a ¯rm is not necessarily associated with population migration
across regions. The conditions for equilibria and their stability under di®erent plant
organization of ¯rms are fully analyzed, whose results are consistent with the above
international and regional facts.
There are some early attempts of modeling the spatial organization of multiplant
¯rms. In the context of international trade, multiplant strategy is called horizontal
foreign direct investment (FDI). Markusen (1984) is the ¯rst to explain horizontal FDI
in trade, while Ota and Fujita (1993) was ¯rst to solve location problem of multiplant
(-unit) ¯rms in the continuous urban space. In monopolistic competition framework,
multiplant ¯rms have ¯rst been introduced by Markusen and Venables (1998) in trade,
although their results heavily rely on numerical examples. Toulemonde (2008) also
consider multiplant ¯rms in Footloose Capital model and analyze monotonic organi-
zation change from multi-plant case to single-plant case under decreasing transporta-
tion costs. Yeaple (2003) considers the optimal organization of multinationals in three
country model across all possible con¯gurations. However stability analysis is still left
aside. Ekholm and Forslid (2001) is the closest in spirit to the present paper as they
introduced multiplant ¯rms in the NEG framework. However, due to their model spec-
i¯cation, formal results obtained are rather limited. Recent works by Fujita and Thisse
(2006) and Fujita and Gokan (2005) consider multiplant ¯rms in the NEG framework.
Their analysis focus on headquarter and plant location under Marshallian externali-
ties among headquarters. However, since Brainard (1993), Brainard (1997), Markusen
and Venables (1998) and others, none of them analyzes non-monotonic organization
changes. Building on Forslid and Ottaviano (2003) with simple modi¯cation and gen-
the ¯rms in Japan except foreign a±liates. The de¯nition of \multiplant (multi-unit) ¯rm", here, is
that an establishment which is not independent and is either main or branch establishment.
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eralization in cost function, we show how proximity-concentration tradeo® appears in
NEG framework and non-monotonic organization changes. This non-monotonic organi-
zation changes with decreasing transportation costs would o®er better understandings
of multinational ¯rms. Against the theoretical prediction in the literature, the com-
mon wisdom would insist that concentration of production comes after exporting. A
¯rm starts domestic supply, subsequently engages in exporting, then establish foreign
a±liates and later concentrate its production in the most cost-e±cient location. How-
ever, to my best knowledge, all of the previous theoretical studies including models
with heterogeneous ¯rms propose the scenario that reduction in transportation costs
always encourage multi-plant ¯rms to become a single-plant exporters to exploit scale
economies. Our generalized model explains the above non-linear organizational change
in terms of e®ects on ¯xed costs of multinationals from transportation (trade) costs
including the need for adjustment for local markets and language barriers be the deter-
minant for organization as well as those on variable costs.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows; in section 2, a two-region single-plant
model is presented as a benchmark. In section 3, multiplant case is allowed, and is
compared with the previous results. First, given a gradual decrease in transportation
costs, the comparison shows monotonic organization change from multiplant to single
plant. In the second step, we extend and generalize our model in order to show more
realistic non-monotonic organization changes. Possible caveats and future extensions
are discussed in the ¯nal section.
2 Location choice without organization choice
The economy is composed of symmetric two regions 1 and 2. There are two
production factors: H units of skilled workers and L units of unskilled workers. While
unskilled workers are equally distributed between regions and are immobile, skilled
workers can freely mobile between the two regions.
2.1 Consumers
We assume that preference is identical across all workers and is expressed by
U =
A1¡¹Q¹
¹¹ (1¡ ¹)1¡¹ ; (1)
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where A stands for the consumption of agricultural good, q (i) is the consumption
of manufactured good variety i 2 [0; N ] and Q is an index of manufactured good
consumption Q =
hR N
0
q (i)
¾¡1
¾ di
i ¾
¾¡1
: N indicates the size of di®erentiated varieties
of manufactured goods and ¾ > 1 is the elasticity of substitution between any pair of
varieties. The expenditure share of manufactured goods is ¹ and that of agricultural
good is 1¡ ¹. We posit pA and p (i) as the price of agricultural good and the delivered
price of a di®erentiated manufactured good i. Interregional trade of manufactured goods
incurs \iceberg" transportation costs and selling one unit in the other region requires
¿ ¸ 1 units to be shipped. Transportation costs can be alternatively interpreted as
trade costs. For later reference, we posit Á = ¿ 1¡¾ 2 [0; 1] as alternative measure
of transportation costs. We may call Á as trade freeness. When transportation costs
are high (low), Á takes the value close to zero (one). Then increasing Á expresses the
decreasing transportation costs and no transportation costs can be expressed by Á = 1.
If the price index of manufactured goods is expressed by P =
hR N
0
p (i)1¡¾ di
i 1
1¡¾
, then
we obtain the demand function for a di®erentiated manufactured good and the indirect
utility function as,
q (i) = ¹
µ
P
p (i)
¶¾
Y
P
, (2)
v =
¡
pA
¢¡(1¡¹)
P¡¹w; for unskilled worker, (3)
V =
¡
pA
¢¡(1¡¹)
P¡¹W; for skilled worker. (4)
Wages for skilled and unskilled worker are expressed by W and w; respectively. We set
¸r as the share of ¯rms in region r, where
P2
r ¸r = 1. Subscript indicates the location,
r 2 [1; 2]. Then we may write regional total income as
Yr =
L
2
wr +WrH¸r: (5)
While the distribution of skilled workers is endogenous, for the simplicity of analysis,
we set the distribution of unskilled workers to be uniform across the two regions, and
normalize the population size as, L = H = 1:
2.2 Agriculture
Agricultural sector produces a homogeneous good under perfect competition and
constant returns to scale using unskilled labour input only. This good is traded cost-
5
lessly. Thus we take agricultural good as num¶eraire and normalize the wage of one unit
of unskilled workers to be one across regions, pA = wr = ws = 1.
2.3 Single-plant ¯rm
In manufacturing sector, we assume that ¯rms are imperfectly competitive µa la
Dixit-Stiglitz and produce di®erentiated goods. Production of a di®erentiated good
incurs one unit of skilled workers as ¯xed costs and one unit of unskilled workers as
marginal labour requirement. When a single-plant ¯rm locates in region r, it faces the
demand from the same region,
³
Pr
pr(i)
´¾
¹Yr
Pr
, and the demand from the other region to
export,
³
Ps
prs(i)
´¾
¹Ys
Ps
=
³
Ps
pr(i)
´¾
¹Ys
Ps
Á; where the delivered price of product from region
r to s is expressed as a prr (i) = pr (i) and prs (i) = pr (i) ¿ . Then the total demand for
a di®erentiated good can be written as,
qr (i) =
µ
Pr
pr (i)
¶¾
¹Yr
Pr
+
µ
Ps
pr (i)
¶¾
¹Ys
Ps
Á: (6)
When single-plant ¯rms export their products to the other region where they do not
locate, they incur transportation costs. The price indices in this case can be written as
P 1¡¾r =
X
r=1;2
Z nr
0
p (i)1¡¾ di; (7)
where nr is the number of ¯rms in region r. As is mentioned in the introduction, all
imperfectly competitive ¯rms are assumed to be exporters with single-plant, when the
number of plants is not a choice variable of a ¯rm. We assume the total mass of ¯rms as
N = H = 1; as long as all ¯rms are single-plant. Moreover, marginal input is assumed
to be one unit of unskilled workers. The pro¯t function of a di®erentiated good ¯rm
with single-plant in one region r can be written as
¼Sr (i) = (pr (i)¡ wr) qr (i)¡W Sr (i) : (8)
The single-plant ¯rm producing variety i chooses its mill price to maximize pro¯t ¼r (i).
The price resulting from the pro¯t maximization is a markup over marginal costs as,
pr (i) =
¾
¾ ¡ 1 : (9)
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Substituting equilibrium price (9) into (7), we obtain
P 1¡¾r =
µ
¾
¾ ¡ 1
¶
1¡¾¢r;
where 4r ´ [¸r + ¸sÁ], which expresses the distribution of ¯rms with respect to region
r. Using the optimal prices both in pro¯t function and in price index, we could obtain
the equilibrium pro¯ts as,
¼Sr (i) =
¹
¾N
·
Yr
¢r
+
Ys
¢s
Á
¸
¡W Sr (i) ; (10)
Imposing the free-entry condition on this monopolistically competitive sector with the
equation in (10) and substituting the total mass of ¯rms, we could ¯nd skilled workers'
reward of an exporting ¯rm in region r with a single-plant as,
W Sr (i) =
¹
¾
·
Yr
¢r
+
Ys
¢s
Á
¸
: (11)
Using (5) and (11), we could perform the analysis on location equilibria with single-
plant monopolistically competitive ¯rms. Location equilibrium is derived from the
comparison of real wage of skilled workers which can be written as,
$Sr
$Ss
=
W Sr
W Ss
µ4r
4s
¶ ¹
¾¡1
: (12)
A stable location equilibria is associated with either a symmetric distribution of skilled
workers between the two regions or the full agglomeration in one region of the two
regions. The latter case is called the core-periphery structure, where ¸1 = 1; ¸2 = 0.
Since all ¯rms are located in one region, this region is called core and the other periphery.
The critical values for trade freeness at which a symmetric equilibrium becomes stable
to unstable under decreasing transportation costs, d
d¸r
¡
$Ss =$
S
r
¢¯¯¯
¸r=
1
2
< 0, is called the
symmetry break point and given by
Ásym =
¡
1¡ ¹
¾
¢ ¡
1¡ ¹
¾
¡ 1
¾
¢¡
1 + ¹
¾
¢ ¡
1 + ¹
¾
¡ 1
¾
¢ : (13)
When the second term of numerator is negative, it means symmetric distribution never
be equilibrium. We may call the condition where core-periphery structure is always
dominant as black-hole condition and show ¾ ¡ ¹ < 1. Note that higher ¹ indicates
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larger expenditure on di®erentiated goods and smaller ¾ indicates a greater love for
variety (hence, larger demand externalities) and more di®erentiation among the goods.
When expenditure share and the love for variety of di®erentiated goods are larger (larger
¹
¾
), ¯rms and skilled workers have stronger incentives to agglomerate, both of symmetry
break point and sustain point are to be lower. Thus we may call ¹
¾
as a composite of
agglomeration forces, which appears throughout this paper. Holding the no-black-hole
condition, ¾¡ ¹ > 1, the e®ect of composite of agglomeration forces is always negative
and it means that when agglomeration forces are stronger, the less stable symmetric
equilibrium is.
On the other location equilibrium, core-periphery structure, where all skilled workers
stay in region r, is locally stable if
¡
$Ss =$
S
r
¢¯¯
¸r=1
< 1. As transportation costs increase,
core-periphery structure become unstable,
¡
$Ss =$
S
r
¢¯¯
¸r=1
> 1. We de¯ne sustain point
as the critical values for trade freeness at which the core-periphery equilibrium becomes
unstable under increasing transportation costs,
¡
$Ss =$
S
r
¢¯¯
¸r=1
= 1 and express sustain
point by Ásus: Then we could obtain the sustain point in the following implicit form:
1 +
¹
¾
Ásus
2 + Ásus
2 ¡ ¹
¾
¡ 2Ásus1¡
¹
¾¡1 = 0: (14)
Di®erentiating equation (14) ; we have d
d¹
S (Á) = ¡ 1
¾
¡
1¡ Á2¢ + 2Á1¡ ¹¾¡1
¾¡1 lnÁ < 0 and
d
d¾
S (Á) = ¹
¾2
¡
1¡ Á2¢¡2Á1¡ ¹¾¡1 ¹
(¾¡1)2 lnÁ > 0:With these results, the e®ect comes from
the composite of expenditure share and elasticity of substitution, ¹
¾
, is clearly negative
on the critical value for sustain point. It means that core-periphery structure is more
sustainable when agglomeration forces are strong. The composite acts as agglomeration
forces.
3 Location and organization choice
In this section, we study the location and organization choice of ¯rms. We only
modify the assumption on the number of plants. Introduction of multiplant ¯rms means
an additional choice for skilled workers. The share of skilled workers in multiplant ¯rms
and that of single-plant ¯rms in region r (= 1; 2) are denoted by, mr and (1¡mr) ;
respectively. Nominal rewards to skilled workers in multiplant ¯rms are assumed to be
the same across regions. Following these speci¯cations, we rewrite regional income in
(5) as
Yr =
L
2
+
¡
(1¡mr)W Sr +mr (1 + ®)WM
¢
N¸r: (15)
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Contrary to single-plant ¯rms, multiplant ¯rms can serve both regions without incur-
ring transportation costs. While for single-plant ¯rms they incur one unit of skilled
workers as is assumed in the previous section, for multiplant ¯rms they incur addi-
tional ¯xed requirements of skilled workers. This additional ¯xed costs to maintain an
additional plant is expressed by ®, which capture communication costs between plants
and management costs for additional managers and engineers.
3.1 Multiplant producer
Multiplant ¯rms are also assumed to be monopolistically competitive ¯rms µa la
Dixit-Stiglitz and produce a di®erentiated good. The only modi¯cation from the single-
plant exporter is that establishment of multiplant incurs additional ¯xed cost, ® > 0.
This ¯xed costs, ®, include the costs for maintaining a subsidiary in the other region
and the duplicate overhead production costs.4 For simplicity, we assume that all of
the skilled workers in a given multiplant ¯rm reside in one of the two regions (but not
both).5
For the production, multiplant ¯rms employ unskilled workers in both regions as
variable input. Contrast to the cost function of single-plant ¯rms, since multiplant
¯rms locate in each region, the shipment of products by multiplant ¯rms doesn't incur
transportation costs, Árr = 1 for (r = 1; 2). Thus the trade-o® between single- and
multi-plant con¯guration is that between transportation costs (proximity) and the scale
economies in single-plant (concentration). Taking each regional demand as given in (2),
multiplant ¯rms maximize their pro¯t. Then the output and the pro¯t function of a
multiplant ¯rm can be written as
q Mrr (i) =
µ
Pr
pr (i)
¶¾
¹Yr
Pr
; (16)
q Mr (i) = q
M
rr (i) + q
M
ss (i) ; (17)
¼M (i) = (pr (i)¡ wr) q Mrr (i)¡ (ps (i)¡ ws) q Mss (i)¡ (1 + ®)WM (i) ; (18)
where superscript M indicates multiplant ¯rms and WM is a skilled workers' reward
in multiplant ¯rms. Since there is no location choice for multiplant ¯rms, their pro¯t
4Fujita and Gokan (2005) assume that the ¯xed cost of a multi-plant ¯rm is larger than that for a
single plant ¯rm. Toulemonde (2008) lists several factors a®ect the ¯xed costs of a multinational.
5Since skilled workers obtain the same nominal wage under mulitplant ¯rms, they reside in the
region with the smaller cost of living, i.e., the smaller price index for di®erentiated goods. The possible
symmetric distribution of skilled workers may occur only when everything is symmetric and can be a
knife-edge case.
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function and their wage for skilled worker do not include region speci¯c subscript.6 A
multiplant ¯rm producing variety i sets region-speci¯c mill price to maximize pro¯t
¼M (i) under discriminatory pricing. The optimal price is given by a markup over
marginal costs as
pr (i) =
¾
¾ ¡ 1 ; r = 1; 2: (19)
Substituting the optimal prices into price index, instead of (7), we obtain the price
index of the varieties sold in region r as
P 1¡¾r =
X
o=M;S
X
r=1;2
Z nor
0
p (i)1¡¾ di
= N
µ
¾
¾ ¡ 1
¶1¡¾
[¸r (1¡mr) + ¸s (1¡ms)Á+ (¸rmr + ¸sms)] (20)
= N
µ
¾
¾ ¡ 1
¶1¡¾
4r (21)
where nor is the number of ¯rms in region r whose organization type is o, o = multiplant
(M) and single-plant (S). We put 4r as the bracketed term in price indices, (20) ; of
region r. We explicitly express the shares of di®erent organization types across regions
by the distribution of skilled workers' residence and the share of each organization
type in each region. In the bracketed term of (20), the ¯rst, second and third terms
represent the share of goods supplied from region r, from region s and by multiplant
¯rms, respectively. Then the equilibrium pro¯ts can be obtained as follows
¼M (i) =
¹
¾N
·
Yr
4r +
Ys
4s
¸
¡ (1 + ®)WM (i) : (22)
The wage of skilled workers are obtained from the zero pro¯t condition, (22). Single-
plant ¯rms' o®er to skilled workers are obtained from the same procedure as in (10)
except that the price index is di®erent. The free-entry condition should hold for any
organization. Hence the condition becomes
max
©
¼Sr (i) ; ¼
S
s (i) ; ¼
M (i)
ª
= 0: (23)
Then, we obtain the skilled workers' reward for single-plant ¯rm i and multiplant ¯rm
6Note that the regional subscript for multi-plant ¯rms are dropped since the symmetric technology
implies the pro¯t of the multi-plant ¯rms as the same, ¼Mr (i) = ¼
M
s (i) : There could be only the
di®erence at the real wage for skilled workers.
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j in region r as,
W Sr (i) =
¹
¾
·
Yr
4r +
Ys
4sÁ
¸
; (24)
WM (j) =
¹
¾ (1 + ®)N
·
Yr
4r +
Ys
4s
¸
: (25)
Note that 1=¾ in (24) and (25) re°ects the share of skilled worker's reward in pro¯t.
Under the same organization, assuming the symmetry of ¯rms in monopolistically com-
petitive sector, without loss of generality, we drop the individual index of i and j.7 Using
¯ve equations, (15), (24) and (25) ;W SA ;W
S
B ;W
M
r ; YA; and YB can be derived explicitly
(See Appendix II). Then we obtain the relative real wages across regions and organiza-
tional patterns as follows:
$Sr
$Mr
=
W Sr
WM
;
$Sr
$Ms
=
W Sr
WM
µ4r
4s
¶ ¹
¾¡1
;
$Ss
$Sr
=
W Ss
W Sr
µ4s
4r
¶ ¹
¾¡1
; (26)
W Sr
WM
=
Á4r +4s + ¹¾ (¸rmr + Á¸sms) (1¡ Á)¡ ¹¾¸s (1¡ Á) (1 + Á)
4r +4s ¡ ¹¾¸r (1¡mr) (1¡ Á)¡ ¹¾¸s (1¡ms) (1¡ Á)
¡; (27)
W Ss
W Sr
=
4r + Á4s + ¹¾ (1¡ Á) (Á¸rmr + ¸sms ¡ ¸r (1 + Á))
Á4r +4s + ¹¾ (1¡ Á) (¸rmr + Á¸sms ¡ ¸s (1 + Á))
; (28)
where ¡ ´ 1 + ®. In a region, both types of organization can exist only when $Mr =
$Sr
¡
=W Sr =W
M
r
¢
holds. Since the price indices are identical in the same region,
comparison of real wages in the same region is boiled down into that of nominal wages.
On the other hand, when all ¯rms are either single-plant or multiplant in a region,
equilibrium wage condition is W Sr > W
M ; or WM > W Sr ; respectively.
3.2 Location equilibrium
Unlike the standard NEG models, there are two choices for ¯rms to be considered;
location and organization. The timing of the decisions follows in the two steps. First,
given the location of skilled workers, ¯rms choose its location. Second,for the given
location, organization is determined. Using (26) to (28), the indirect utility di®erentials
on locations or organizations are de¯ned. Since we have three variables which determine
7In each case, the labour market clearing condition of skilled workers implies the total mass of
¯rms as N = 1 for the case of single-plant ¯rms and N = 1= (1 + ®) for the case of multi-plant ¯rms.
Note that, obviously, the number of ¯rms under all-multi-plant-¯rms case is smaller than that under
all-single-plant-¯rms case. On the other hand, when both types co-exist, the total mass of ¯rms is
given by N = 1¸1(1¡m1)+¸2(1¡m2)+(1+®)(¸1m1+¸2m2) .
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the equilibrium, ¸;8 mr, and ms, this system of equations is highly complicated.
If the o®ered wage of a ¯rm is less than the others', the ¯rm cannot enter or remain
the market because of the lack of ¯xed requirement. Organization of ¯rms is deter-
mined according to pro¯t maximization. Clearly, when the operational pro¯t (and
hence the bid wage for skilled workers) is larger for a given organization, this organi-
zation is adopted. Otherwise, both organizations coexist, $Sr = $
M
r . An organization
equilibrium is stable if, for any marginal deviation from the equilibrium, the ordering
of real wages under di®erent organization choices is unchanged. An organization and
location equilibrium is de¯ned by a set of payo®s
©
$Sr (i) ; $
S
s (i) ; $
M
r (i) ; $
M
s (i)
ª
and
outcomes of organization type in terms of the share of multiplant ¯rms in core-region,
mr and ms.
Due to the complexity of equilibrium, we focus on core-periphery structure and the
organization equilibrium. Similarly to the previous section, the sustainability condition
of core-periphery structure is expressed as
¡
$Ss =$
S
r
¢¯¯
¸r=1
< 1: The critical value as
sustain point changes from the one in (14) to the one as,
$Ss
$Sr
¯¯¯
¸r=1
¡ 1 ´ £ ¡mr; ÁMsus¢
=
³
ÁMsus
¡
1¡ ÁMsus
¢ ¡
1 + ¹
¾
¢
mr +
³
1 +
¡
ÁMsus
¢2 ¡ ¹
¾
¡
1¡ ÁMsus
¢ ¡
1 + ÁMsus
¢´´
¡ ¡mr ¡1¡ ÁMsus¢+ ÁMsus¢¡ ¹¾¡1 ¡¡1¡ ÁMsus¢ ¡1 + ¹¾¢mr + 2ÁMsus¢ = 0:
(29)
As long as transportation costs, Á, holds the range of £ (mr; Á) < 0; the core-periphery
structure is sustainable. Note that this expression doesn't contain the term of cost
di®erential between single and multi plant ¯rms but contain the share of multi-plant
only. This is because above equation is location choice of single-plant ¯rms not orga-
nization choice between single and multi plant ¯rms, whose determination is shown in
the next section. When there is no multi-plant ¯rms, mr = 0, the expression in (29) is
boiled down into (14). Detailed derivation is in Appendix III. In order to examine the
e®ect of multi-plant, we obtain the di®erence and its derivative of (29), compare the
sustain point under all-single plant, ÁSsus, and under multi-plant, Á
M
sus. Then we have
ÁMsus < Á
S
sus for 8mr 2 (0; 1]. Summarizing the above results, we have the following
proposition.
Proposition 1 Presence of multiplant ¯rms unambiguously decrease the sustain point.
As is stated in Proposition 1, the presence of multiplant ¯rms makes the core-
8Note that we put ¸ ´ ¸r since ¸r + ¸s = 1 in two region model:
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periphery structure more sustainable. For a given Á < ÁSsus, the share of multiplant
¯rms which satis¯es (29) can be interpreted as the minimum share of multiplant ¯rms
which insures core-periphery structure, which is analyzed in the next section. From
these conditions, we understand that the possible unstability of core-periphery structure
may arise only if Á < ÁSsus and if mr is smaller than the minimum value, which appears
in footnote 10.
3.3 Organization equilibrium
We consider core-periphery structures of regions where skilled mobile workers stay
in one region and number the core region as 1 and periphery as 2. In order to clarify the
possible organization changes, we identify critical values for three organization cases; all-
¯rms-multiplant, mixed, and all-¯rms-single-plant. Using (26) and (27), and evaluating
each equations for the two extreme case that all ¯rms are the same organization type,
then we obtain the following critical values respectively;
W S1
WM
¯¯¯¯
m1=1
=
(1 + ®)
2
³
1 +
¹
¾
+ Á
³
1¡ ¹
¾
´´
7 1
, Á ? ÁM =
¡
1¡ ¹
¾
¢¡ ® ¡1 + ¹
¾
¢
(1 + ®)
¡
1¡ ¹
¾
¢ ; (30)
W S1
WM
¯¯¯¯
m1=0
=
2 (1 + ®)Á¡
1¡ ¹
¾
¢
+
¡
1 + ¹
¾
¢
Á
7 1
, Á 7 ÁS = 1¡
¹
¾
1¡ ¹
¾
+ 2®
: (31)
We de¯ne ÁM as the critical value for trade freeness below which all the ¯rms are mul-
tiplant and ÁS as the one above which all ¯rms are single-plant. For a given additional
¯xed costs, ÁM and ÁS determine the boundaries that all ¯rms are the same organiza-
tion or not. The solid lines depict ÁM and the dashed lines depict ÁS, respectively. The
possible organization con¯guration is described in Figure 1.9
From (30) and (31), we could observe there are two forces at work. One is the mag-
9The parameters to be speci¯ed follows the average of the estimation results in Table 4 by Hanson
(2005) as ¾ = 2:11; and ¹ = 0:71. Under these speci¯cations, we have the break point in (13) and
sustain point (14) as 0:109 and 0:047. The sustain point, ÁSsus,is indicated by dotted line.
In order to insure the existence of sustain point, we check the stability of core-periphery structure
by utilizing (29). Avoiding black-hole condition, 1 > ¹¾¡1 , core-periphery structure may be unstable
when transportation costs are very high. As is stated in Proposition 1, some presence of multiplant
¯rms makes core-periphery structure more stable. In other words, some portion of multiplant ¯rms
are needed to be stable core-periphery structure. We can check this condition by substituting Á = 0
into £ (mr; Á) and solving for mr. Then we have the minimum share of multiplant ¯rms which insures
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Figure 1: Organization con¯gration
nitude of additional ¯xed costs, ®, and the other is the agglomeration force, ¹
¾
, which
also appears in symmetry break point in (13) and expresses the market size in terms
core-periphery structure as,
mr =
µ
1¡ ¹¾
1 + ¹¾
¶ 1
1¡ ¹
¾¡1
:
When the share of multiplant is smaller than the minimum value, core-periphery structure is unstable
at Á = 0. For a given Á < ÁSsus, the munimum value can be obtained numerically and be characterized
by mr which satis¯es £ (mr; Á) = 0. As is obtained in Appendix IV, the share of multiplant ¯rms
is a decreasing function of transportation costs and additional ¯xed costs. Thus the unstable area of
core-periphery structure should be bounded by ÁSsus, Á
M
sus and vertical axis, which is shown in Figure 1.
ÁMsus is indicated by solid line. Note when 1 <
¹
¾¡1 ; mr exceeds its permissible range. This is the case of
black-hole condition where core-periphery structure is always stable. The minimum share of multiplant
which insures core-periphery structure is 14:3% when ® = 3:466 at Á = 0. As the comparative statics
of m1 is shown in appendix, higher additional costs and transportation costs decrease the share of
multiplants. Thus as transportation costs decreases, the minimum share of multiplant at a given
transportation costs is smaller than the one at Á = 0: In this sence, the one obtained above can be
called the maximum of minimum share of multiplant ¯rms.
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of expenditure share and the degree of di®erentiation among products. The two forces
clearly show the proximity-concentration trade o®. While when trade freeness is low,
multiplant is adopted to be close to the markets, when trade freeness is high, concen-
tration of plants as single-plant ¯rm is adopted. However, when the additional ¯xed
costs is so high, only some ¯rms can adopt multiplant. From (30) ; if cost di®erential
between single-plant and multiplant is large, ® >
¡
1¡ ¹
¾
¢
=
¡
1 + ¹
¾
¢
; then ÁM always
takes negative values and all-¯rms-multiplant case never happens.
As the additional ¯xed costs becomes smaller, the ranges that all ¯rms are multi-
plant expands. For Á < ÁM ; all ¯rms are multiplant and for ÁS < Á, all ¯rms choose to
locate in core-region and be single-plant. Thus when ¯rms face decreasing transporta-
tion costs, the organization con¯guration goes through mixed case to all-single case.
Decreasing transportation costs makes the the magnitude of agglomeration force larger
and induce the share of multiplant ¯rms smaller. For the range of ÁM < Á < ÁS, since
some ¯rms are single-plant, this is the mixed con¯guration of organizations.10 Thus
we could ¯nd that there are always incentives for some ¯rms to be multiplant. When
transportation costs are high, ¯rms have incentives to be multiplant. Above discus-
sions could be summarized by the following proposition. Moreover, since ÁMsus and Á
S
sus
is continuous at mr = 0, the intersection of Á
S
sus and Á
S coincides the one with ÁMsus.
Proposition 2 For a given additional ¯xed costs, ® 2 (0; 1], ¯rms choose their orga-
nization as,
i) if 0 < Á < ÁM ; all ¯rms are multiplant,
ii) if ÁM < Á < ÁS; multiplant and single-plant ¯rms are mixed,
iii) if ÁS < Á < 1; all ¯rms are single-plant.
See the proof in Appendix IV. Conducting comparative statics, we have d
d®
ÁM =
¡ 2
(1+®)2(1¡¹¾ )
< 0; d
d®
ÁS = ¡ 2(1¡
¹
¾ )
(1¡¹¾+2®)
2 < 0. Increase in the additional ¯xed costs
induce both critical values smaller and makes the ranges for all-¯rms-multiplant shrinks.
If cost structure of multiplant and single-plant is such that ® · 0, then multiplant
organization is always dominant. Note when ® = 0; we have ÁM = ÁS = 1 but
the possibility of single-plant is measure zero at Á = 1. Moreover, we have d
d¹
¾
ÁM =
¡ 2®
(1+®)(1¡¹¾ )
2 < 0;
d
d¹
¾
ÁS = ¡ 2®
(1¡¹¾+2®)
2 < 0: When the products are more di®erentiated
and their expenditure share is larger, the ranges for all-¯rms-multiplant shrinks, as
well. These results are consistent with the prediction of the facts mentioned in the
10There is always one critical value of ÁS and it exhibits inverse proportion which doesn't cross
alpha-axis. So there are always the ranges for the coexistence of single-plant exporter and multiplant.
The uniquness of the solution is shown in Appendix IV.
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introduction that secondary and tertiary sector, which produce more di®erentiated
products than agriculture have larger share of mulit-establishment.
It should be mentioned on organization equilibrium under unstable area of core-
periphery structure. The conditions of unstable core-periphery structure is that trans-
portation costs are higher than sustain point and that share of multiplant is smaller than
its minimum value. The former is the necessary condition and implies !S2 > !
S
1 . The
latter implies that the organization con¯guration is mixed, WM1 = W
S
1 . Additionally,
since periphery region needs to import all the manufactured goods produced by single
plant ¯rms, its price index is higher, P2 > P1. Thus we have
!M2
!M1
= P1W
M
P2WM
= P1
P2
< 1.
From these conditions, when core-periphery structure is unstable, we have
!S2 > !
S
1 =W
S
1 =W
M
1 = !
M
1 > !
M
2 : (32)
4 Generalization
Before dealing with generalization, let us summarize our main results. When we
consider organization choice in a two-region model, as is shown in the previous sec-
tion, we could ¯nd three organization con¯gurations under core-periphery structure;
all-multiplant , mixed, and all-single-plant. From the critical values of organization
con¯guration in (30) and (31), the proximity-concentration tradeo® is observed and
always exists.
It would give us su±cient discussions to examine more on the speci¯cation of the
additional ¯xed costs for multiplant ¯rms. Until previous sections, we assumed constant
¯xed costs on both types of organization. However, it might be reasonable to think the
fact that high transportation costs could be applied not only for goods transportation
but also for establishment of secondary plants, transfer of managers, and supplemental
communication across borders. Due to cultural and language di®erences, managers may
confront communication di±culties with local unskilled workers and unexpected extra
works for the resolutions. Tastes di®erence in each market needs further investment in
research and development activities in which skilled workers engage. Such additional
¯xed costs can be captured as a function of broadly de¯ned transportation costs which
include communication costs as well. In order to capture these aspects, di®erently from
the constant additional ¯xed costs case, (18), we simply reformulate the ¯xed cost to
have another plant to be ®Á¡b so that the pro¯t of a multiplant ¯rm can be rewritten
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as,
¼M (i) = (pr (i)¡ wr) q Mrr (i)¡ (ps (i)¡ ws) q Mss (i)¡
¡
1 + ®Á¡b
¢
WM (i) ; (33)
For a better notation, we de¯ne the di®erence in ¯xed costs as ¡ ´ ¡1 + ®Á¡b¢. The
demand functions are unchanged as in the last section, (16) and (17). Then the pro¯t
maximization yields the same price as in (19). Substituting this optimal price into
pro¯t function and price index, normalization of labour wage in competitive sector as
one, wr = ws = 1, the equilibrium pro¯ts under a given distribution of ¯rms can be
obtained as follows,
¼M (i) =
¹
¾N
·
Yr
4r +
Ys
4s
¸
¡ ¡WM (i) ; (34)
where 4r and 4s expresses the brackets of price indices in region r and s; Pr = 4
1
1¡¾
r ;
which is the same as the last section11. Applying the zero pro¯t condition on this pro¯t
function, we obtain the wage of skilled workers as follows,
WM (j) =
¹
¾¡N
·
Yr
4r +
Ys
4s
¸
: (35)
Moreover, regional income is expressed not as in (15) but as
Yr =
L
2
+
¡
(1¡mr)W Sr +mr¡WM
¢
N¸r:
Again, skilled workers seek for the ¯rm which o®ers highest rewards. Since the refor-
mulation in the additional ¯xed costs, ¡, doesn't a®ect neither the system of equations
listed in (A1) nor the solutions in (A2), we could fully utilize the previous results in
Appendix V12 and we obtain the nominal wage di®erential as
W S1
WM
¯¯¯¯
m1=1
=
¡
2
³
1 +
¹
¾
+
³
1¡ ¹
¾
´
Á
´
= 1 (36)
W S1
WM
¯¯¯¯
m1=0
=
2¡Á¡
1¡ ¹
¾
+
¡
1 + ¹
¾
¢
Á
¢ = 1 (37)
11Note that the size of ¯rms changes as N = 1¸1(1¡m1)+¸2(1¡m2)+¡(¸1m1+¸2m2) when both types
co-exisit, N = 1¡(¸1m1+¸2m2) when all-multiplant ¯rms case.
12As is shown in appendix, the systems of equations in Sections 3 and 4 are identical except the
speci¯cation in the cost di®erential, ¡. Thus when we could obtain the result by using (27). Note that
¡ 2 [0; 1] ; since ¡ > 0 and ¡¡ 1 = ¡®Á¡b=(1 + ®Á¡b) < 0.
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Substituting ¡ ´ ¡1 + ®Á¡b¢, critical values of Á consistent with W S1 = WM for (36)
and (37) are obtained in the following implicit form;
¡
ÁM
¢b ¡
1¡ ÁM¢ ¡1¡ ¹
¾
¢
1 + ¹
¾
+ ÁM
¡
1¡ ¹
¾
¢ = ®; (38)
1
2
¡
ÁS
¢b¡1 ¡
1¡ ÁS¢ ³1¡ ¹
¾
´
= ®; (39)
respectively. To illustrate the result, Figure 2 depicts the case of b = 1, ¡ ´ 1 +
®Á¡1 where additional ¯xed costs is a function of trade costs. From this ¯gure, when
additional ¯xed costs is relatively low with decreasing trade costs, we could observe
non-linear con¯guration of organizations, which starts from mixed case and moves to
all-multiplant, all-multiplant to mixed and mixed to all-single. The condition for this
organization con¯guration is ® < Á (1¡ Á) ¡1¡ ¹
¾
¢
=
¡
1 + ¹
¾
+ Á
¡
1¡ ¹
¾
¢¢
; which is the
case of b = 1 of (38). Then we have two critical values of ÁM and between the two critical
values, there is organization con¯guration that all ¯rms are multiplant. On the other
hand, when additional ¯xed costs is relatively high, organization changes from mixed
into all-single, monotonically. Note on the stable range of core-periphery structure, as
is in the previous section, the intersection of ÁSsus and Á
S coincides the one with ÁMsus.
For further discussion, in Figure 3 we show the critical values of Á under di®erent values
of b. The e®ect of transportation costs on additional ¯xed costs of multiplant may be
more than proportional. Such cases are described in this ¯gure. When the parameter
of additional ¯xed costs, ®, is large, the organization con¯guration that all ¯rms are
single plant is dominant and no possible organization change. When it is smaller, we
could con¯rm that possible organization con¯guration of three types (all-multi, mixed,
and all-single). The unstable area of core-periphery structure is omitted in Figure
3 for clarity but the property is the same as previous ones. When transportation
costs are very high, ¯rms cannot establish multiplant due to high additional ¯xed
costs so they export. With decreasing transportation costs, ¯rms don't export but
establish multiplant. With further decrease in transportation costs, the economies of
scale in single-plant become su±cient and a®ord transportation costs so that ¯rms
choose to concentrate their production into single location. The results fully describe
the proximity-concentration tradeo® of reality. In certain ranges of ®, we could con¯rm
that organization change occurs as single-plant to multiplant and multiplant to single-
plant. The possible organization con¯gurations are from all-single to mixed, mixed to
all-multi, and vice versa. If ® · Áb (1¡Á)(1¡
¹
¾ )
1+¹
¾
+Á(1¡¹¾ )
holds, there is at least one critical value of
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ÁM and three organization con¯gurations. If ® · 1
2
Áb¡1 (1¡ Á) ¡1¡ ¹
¾
¢
holds, there is
at least one critical value of ÁS and at least two organization con¯gurations. Note that
when Áb
(1¡Á)(1¡¹¾ )
1+¹
¾
+Á(1¡¹¾ )
< ® · 1
2
Áb¡1 (1¡ Á) ¡1¡ ¹
¾
¢
hold, we have mixed case guaranteed
by !S1 = !
M
1 and the share of multiplant ¯rms can be written asm1 =
2¡Á¡Á(1+¹¾ )¡(1¡¹¾ )
(1¡Á)(1¡¡)(1+¹¾ )
.
For detailed derivation, see Appendix V. Summarizing the above discussions leads the
following proposition.
Proposition 3 Suppose that the additional ¯xed costs for multiplant is a function of
transportation costs,
¡
1 + ®Á¡b
¢
.
i) if ® · Áb (1¡Á)(1¡
¹
¾ )
1+¹
¾
+Á(1¡¹¾ )
holds, all-multiplant organization is dominant.
ii) if Áb
(1¡Á)(1¡¹¾ )
1+¹
¾
+Á(1¡¹¾ )
< ® · 1
2
Áb¡1 (1¡ Á) ¡1¡ ¹
¾
¢
holds, organization is mixed be-
tween single-plant and multiplant.
iii) if ® > 1
2
Áb¡1 (1¡ Á) ¡1¡ ¹
¾
¢
holds, single-plant organization is dominant.
Compared to the results in the previous section, we ¯nd the possible organization
changes from single-plant into multiplant and multiplant to single plant. If the cost
di®erential between the two organizations is small enough, the range of multiplant
¯rms is larger. On the other hand, when the cost di®erential is larger, single-plant
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is organizationally dominant. In the other words, for smaller additional ¯xed costs,
®, more likely ¯rms become multiplant. Di®erently from the previous studies in the
literature, from the generalized analysis, we observe non-monotonic organization change
as single-plant to multiplant and from multiplant to single-plant. In the other words,
when ® · Áb (1¡Á)(1¡
¹
¾ )
1+¹
¾
+Á(1¡¹¾ )
holds, there are three organizations, all-single, mixed and all-
multiplant. When Áb
(1¡Á)(1¡¹¾ )
1+¹
¾
+Á(1¡¹¾ )
< ® · 1
2
Áb¡1 (1¡ Á) ¡1¡ ¹
¾
¢
holds, there are mixed
organization and single-plant. Otherwise, there are always all-single plant organization.
5 Conclusion
The globalization and the development of transportation and information tech-
nologies can be characterized by lower transportation costs of factors. At the same
time, it is not negligible that there is a certain presence of multiplant ¯rms in interna-
tional and regional economies. In order to focus on the behavior and organization of
multiplant, we explicitly relax the implicit and typical assumption on the solitariness
of ¯rms' organization in monopolistic competition. In particular, we focus on the case
which starts from the core-periphery structure; all skilled workers locates in one region.
Firstly, we show that the decrease in transportation costs induce ¯rms concentrate
20
their production from multiplant into a single-plant in all cases. As Ekholm and Forslid
(2001) pointed out, \the fact that trade costs and the degree of multiplant economies of
scale may change simultaneously has important implications". We show that the com-
bination of transportation costs and the cost di®erential between the two organization
crucially a®ects the organization change. This is consistent with the simulation results
in Markusen and Venables (1998). In the next step, we specify the additional ¯xed
costs to be multiplant as a function of transportation costs. Then we could observe the
organization change not only from multiplant into single-plant but also single-plant to
multiplant. Intuitively, most of the histories of multiplant (multinational) ¯rms would
be such that ¯rstly a ¯rm was established in a region, served the region domestically,
gradually started exporting from there, subsequently established secondary plants in
the other regions, and later concentrated some of the plants into a few. Our general-
ized results that ¯rms change their organization non-monotonically could explain this
intuitive history of multiplant (multinational) ¯rms. In our model, the regions are sym-
metric except mobile skilled workers. Introduction of asymmetric wage could capture
the other motivations which is not examined in this paper, c.f. cheaper-wage-seeking
vertical FDI. In empirical analysis following Brainard (1997), it sometimes occurs that
the coe±cients of tari® and transportation costs are insigni¯cant or wrong sign. These
may capture the nonlinear e®ects of broadly de¯ned trade costs on ¯xed requirements
as shown in the previous section.
From our analysis, some analytical results are emphasized. Firstly, the di®erence
in ¯xed costs between single-exporter and multiplant ¯rm in°uences on the stability
of core-periphery structure. When it is easier to become multiplant, lower additional
establishment costs, then core-periphery structure is more sustainable than the case
without multiplant ¯rms. When establishment costs becomes lower, more ¯rms choose
multiplant. Secondly, under core-periphery structure, we show that there is a range
of transportation costs where there is mixed organization and that the cost di®erential
between two organization and agglomeration forces exhibit the proximity-concentration
trade o®. Thirdly, nonlinear e®ect of transportation costs on ¯xed costs could show
non-monotonic organization change. Through our analysis, we could con¯rm that trans-
action costs unambiguously a®ects not only the location choice of ¯rms but also a®ects
their organization choice.
More detailed analysis would show some more interesting possibilities. There would
be other formulation on the di®erences of transaction costs in di®erent organization.
In particular, in our model, the role of establishment costs needs managers or skilled
21
workers. They are assumed to consume in the region of their residency, or say the place
of headquarter. However, in the process of establishment of multiplant, many managers
are sent to the region and sometimes they spend more than ten years. It might be one
way to change the assumption on the location of consumption. Hence, it would be
interesting to relax single-location assumption for skilled workers in multiplant ¯rms.
Such extensions is left for the future work.
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Appendix I
Using four equations, (5) ; (11) ;and the corresponding equations for the other re-
gion, we obtain W S1 ;W
S
2 ; Y1; Y2 explicitly.
W S1 =
¹
¾
h
Y1
41 +
Y2
42Á
i
;
W S2 =
¹
¾
h
Y1
41Á+
Y2
42
i
;
Y1 =
1
2
+ ¸W S1 ;
Y2 =
1
2
+ (1¡ ¸)W S2 ;
9>>>>>=>>>>>;
where ¢1 = [¸+ (1¡ ¸)Á] ; ¢2 = [¸Á+ (1¡ ¸)]. Note that since H = L = 1 and
N = 1. This yields a unique solution as,
Y1 =
41(42¡¹¾ ((1¡¸)¡¸Á))
2©S
;
Y2 =
42(41¡¹¾ (¸+(1¡¸)Á))
2©S
;
W S1 =
¹
¾
Á41+42¡¹¾ (1¡Á)(1+Á)(1¡¸)
2©S
;
W S2 =
¹
¾
41+Á42¡¹¾¸(1¡Á)(1+Á)
2©S
;
9>>>>>=>>>>>;
where ©S = 4142 ¡ ¹¾ (1¡ ¸)41 ¡ ¹¾¸42 +
¡
¹
¾
¢2
¸ (1¡ Á) (1 + Á) (1¡ ¸).
Appendix II
We set the share of single-plant ¯rms and that of multiplant ¯rms as (1¡mr) and
mr; r = 1; 2 and put ¡ ´ (1 + ®). Note that, for simpler notation, we set the share of
¯rms in each region as ¸r, where
P2
r ¸r = 1.
W Sr =
¹
¾N
h
Yr
4r +
Ys
4sÁ
i
;
WM = ¹
¾¡N
h
Yr
4r +
Ys
4s
i
;
Yr =
L
2
+ ¸r (1¡mr)W Sr + ¸rmr¡WM ;
9>>=>>; (A1)
where 4r = ¸r (1¡mr)+¸s (1¡ms)Á+(¸rmr + ¸sms). Since there are ¯ve unknown
variables with ¯ve equations, we obtain a unique solution. Wages for each ¯rms are as
follows
W S1 =
¹
¾ (Á41+42+¹¾ (1¡Á)(¸1m1+Á¸2m2¡¸2(1+Á)))
2N©M
W S2 =
¹
¾ (41+Á42+¹¾ (1¡Á)(Á¸1m1+¸2m2¡¸1(1+Á)))
2N©M
WM =
¹
¾ (41+42¡¹¾ (1¡Á)(¸1(1¡m1)+¸2(1¡m2)))
2¡N©M
9>>>=>>>; (A2)
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where ©M = 4142¡¹¾¸142¡¹¾¸241+
¡
¹
¾
¢2
¸1¸2 (1¡ Á) (Á (1¡m2) (1¡m1) + 1¡m1m2).
As is expected, when all ¯rms are single plant, m1 = m2 = 0, this denominator is iden-
tical to the one in the previous section, ©S, and wage equations as well.
Appendix III
Since sustain points are not obtained analytically, we de¯ne them implicitly. In
order to examine the e®ect from the existence of multi-plant ¯rms to location equi-
librium under core-periphery structure, we compare the sustain point under all-single
plant, ÁSsus, and under multi-plant, Á
M
sus. Precisely, we obtain the derivative of implicit
function of sustain point, £ (mr; Á) ; and show
d
dmr
£(mr; Á)
¯¯¯
mr=0
< 0 at Á = ÁSsus.
Proof. Using the equations (A2) listed in Appendix II, we have the sustain-
ability condition,
¡
$Ss =$
S
r
¢¯¯
¸r=1
< 1; and the sustain point as
(mr (1¡ Á) + Á)
¹
¾¡1 Á(1¡Á)(1+
¹
¾ )mr+(1+Á
2¡¹
¾
(1¡Á)(1+Á))
(1¡Á)(1+¹¾ )mr+2Á
= 1:
Rearranging this equation, we could implicitly de¯ne the sustain point, ÁMsus, trans-
portation costs, which satisfy the following equality and guarantee the core-periphery
structure, as
£ (mr; Á) ´
¡
Á (1¡ Á) ¡1 + ¹
¾
¢
mr +
¡
1 + Á2 ¡ ¹
¾
(1¡ Á) (1 + Á)¢¢
¡ (mr (1¡ Á) + Á)¡
¹
¾¡1
¡
(1¡ Á) ¡1 + ¹
¾
¢
mr + 2Á
¢
= 0:
Note that £ (0; 0) = 1 ¡ ¹
¾
; £(0; 1) = 0;£(1; 0) = ¡2¹
¾
; and £ (1; 1) = 0. The
sustain point for all-single plant in (14), ÁSsus, is obtained by specifying mr = 0 as,
£ (0; Á) ´ ¡Á2 ¡ ¹
¾
(1¡ Á) (1 + Á) + 1¢¡ 2Á1¡ ¹¾¡1 = 0:
d
dmr
£(mr; Á) = ¡ (1¡ Á)
µ
(1¡Á)(1+¹¾ )(1¡ ¹¾¡1)mr+Á(1¡
¹(¾+1)
¾(¾¡1) )
(mr+(1¡mr)Á)1+
¹
¾¡1
¡ Á ¡1 + ¹
¾
¢¶
;
d
dmr
£(mr; 0) = ¡m1¡
¹
¾¡1
r
¡
1¡ ¹
¾¡1
¢ ¡
1 + ¹
¾
¢
< 0;
d
dmr
£(mr; 1) = 0;
d
dmr
£(0; Á) = ¡ (1¡ Á)
³
Á¡
¹
¾¡1
³
1¡ ¹(¾+1)
¾(¾¡1)
´
¡ Á ¡1 + ¹
¾
¢´
;
d
dmr
£(1; Á) = (1¡ Á)
³
Á
³
1¡ ¹(¾+1)
¾(¾¡1)
´
+ (1¡ Á) ¡1 + ¹
¾
¢ ¡
1¡ ¹
¾¡1
¢¡ Á ¡1 + ¹
¾
¢´
.
The plot of this di®erence and its derivative are shown in Figure 4.13 In the ¯gure, thin
line indicates £ (0; Á), the dotted line £ (mr; Á) ; and dashed line
d
dmr
£(mr; Á). As is
repeated, the value where £ (0; Á) = 0 indicates ÁSsus.
When ÁSsus; which satis¯es £ (0; Á) = 0, is smaller than
d
dmr
£(mr; Á) = 0, then we
have d
dmr
£(mr; Á)
¯¯¯
mr=0
< 0 at Á = ÁSsus and Á
S
sus > Á
M
sus. It means that increase in the
share of multiplant ¯rms makes the sustain point decreased, as in Figure 4.
13The parameters speci¯ed is the same with the other ¯gures except mr = 0:3.
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0
1
Á
Ásus
Core-periphery structure is sustainable.
Figure 4: Sustain point and the share of multi-plant ¯rms
In order to clarify the sign of the derivative at Á = ÁSsus; we simply take the di®erence
of £ (0; Á) and the derivative of £ (mr; Á) evaluating at mr = 0 as,
£ (0; Á)¡ d
dmr
£(mr; Á)
¯¯¯
mr=0
=
¡
1¡ ¹
¾
¢¡Á (1¡ 2Á) ¡1 + ¹
¾
¢¡³Á¡ ¹¾¡1 (1¡ Á)³1¡ ¹(¾+1)
¾(¾¡1)
´
¡ 2Á
´
:
Observing the equation, as Á approaches to 0, the ¯rst term remains to be constant,
1¡ ¹
¾
, the second converges to 0 and the third term to ¡1. In total, the terms converges
to ¡1. On the other hand, as Á approaches to 1, the sum of ¯rst and second terms
converge to 2; and the third term to ¡2. In total, the terms converges to zero. Thus
we have £ (0; Á) < d
dmr
£(mr; Á)
¯¯¯
mr=0
; 8Á 2 (0; 1).
Appendix IV
The proof of Proposition 2
Proof. Solving for the nominal wage di®erential between single-plant and multiplant
equal to one, and without evaluating m1; we could obtain the following equation from
(27) for the given ¯xed cost di®erential, ¡ = (1 + ®),
F (m1) ´ !
S
1
!M1
¡ 1 = WS1
WM
¡ 1 = ­1
­2
;
where ­1 ´ ® (1¡ Á)
¡
1 + ¹
¾
¢
m1¡(1¡ Á)
¡
1¡ ¹
¾
¢
+2®Á, and ­2 ´ (1¡ Á)
¡
1 + ¹
¾
¢
m1+¡
1 + ¹
¾
¢
Á+
¡
1¡ ¹
¾
¢
. The sign of F (m1) is of interest. If F (m1) > 0; all ¯rms are single
plant and if F (m1) < 0; all ¯rms are multiplant. When there is m1 2 [0; 1] such that
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F (m1) = 0; some ¯rms are multiplant. A simulation of F (m1) is in Figure 5,
14 which
has the correspondence with Figure 1 and there is a range of m1 2 [0; 1]. Since ­2 > 0;
8m1 2 [0; 1] ; we could focus on the sign of numerator, ­1. Solving ­1 for m1, then we
have a solution for m1 2 [0; 1] as m1 = (1¡
¹
¾ )
®(1+¹¾ )
¡ 2Á
(1¡Á)(1+¹¾ )
; which is unique for any
given Á and guarantee !S1 = !
M
1 . Note that
d
dÁ
m1 = ¡ 2(1¡Á)2(1+¹¾ ) < 0 and
d
d®
m1 =
¡ 1¡
¹
¾
®2(1+¹¾ )
< 0. In a di®erent way, solving ­1 for Á, then we have the function of Á (m1) as
Á (m1) = 1¡ 2®(1¡¹¾ )¡®m1(1+¹¾ )+2® with Á (0) =
1¡¹
¾
1¡¹
¾
+2®
and Á (1) =
(1¡¹¾ )¡®(1+¹¾ )
(1+®)(1¡¹¾ )
; which
we have in (30) and (31) as the critical values for di®erent organization con¯guration.
d
dm1
Á (m1) = ¡ 2®
2(1+¹¾ )
((1¡¹¾ )¡®m1(1+¹¾ )+2®)
2 < 0:
Figure 5: Intermediate value of share of multiplant
Appendix V
The proof of Proposition 3
Proof. Solving for the nominal wage di®erential between single-plant and multiplant
equal to one, and without evaluating m1 and specifying the ¯xed cost di®erence in ¡,
we could obtain the following equation from (27) ;
G (m1) ´ !
S
1
!M1
¡ 1 = WS1
WM
¡ 1 = ­3
­4
;
where ­3 ´ (1¡ Á)
¡
1 + ¹
¾
¢
(1¡ ¡)m1+
¡
1 + ¹
¾
¢
Á+
¡
1¡ ¹
¾
¢¡2¡Á, and ­4 ´ (1¡ Á) ¡1 + ¹¾¢m1
+
¡
1 + ¹
¾
¢
Á +
¡
1¡ ¹
¾
¢
. If G (m1) > 0; all ¯rms are single plant and if G (m1) < 0, all
14We set the parameters as ® = 0:2: The other two parameters, ¾ and ¹, are the same as before.
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¯rms are multiplant. Note that ­4 = ­2 > 0 8m1 2 [0; 1]. From the equation, it
is obvious that for given ¡ and Á, G (m1) is continuous. So we could focus on the
sign of numerator, ­3. Solving ­3jm1=0 · 0 for ® yields the equation in (28). If
® · 1
2
Áb¡1 (1¡ Á) ¡1¡ ¹
¾
¢
holds, ­3jm1=0 · 0; otherwise ­3jm1=0 > 0 and there is
no possible multiplant organization. Solving ­3 for m1, then we have a solution for
m1 2 [0; 1] as m1 = 2¡Á¡Á(1+
¹
¾ )¡(1¡¹¾ )
(1¡Á)(1¡¡)(1+¹¾ )
; which is unique for any given Á and guarantee
!S1 = !
M
1 . Note that
d
d®
m1 = ¡ (1¡
¹
¾ )Á
b
(1+¹¾ )®2
< 0: A simulation of G (m1) is depicted in Fig-
ure 6,15 which has the correspondence with Figure 3 and shows two separated ranges
of m1 2 [0; 1].
Figure 6: Intermediate value of share of multiplant
15We set the parameters as ® = 0:06 and b = 2: The other two parameters, ¾ and ¹, are the same
as before.
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